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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 960149-CA

KENNETH D. SOUZA,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions on six charges:
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony; tampering with
evidence, a second degree felony; failure to pay drug stamp tax,
a third degree felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal,
a third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor; and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor.

This

Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to

compel disclosure of the St. George police department's "hot
pursuit" policy?
The trial court's decision to deny a motion to compel
represents a discretionary ruling, reviewed deferentially on
appeal.
2.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motions for a mistrial, made: 1) when the court
permitted Kim Randall, a defense witness, to testify on the first
day of trial while clothed in prison garb; and 2) when the court
refused to recall Randall after determining, through a proffer,
that further testimony from him on the second day of trial would
be cumulative and repetitive?
A reviewing court gives a trial court a "great deal" of
discretion when it denies a motion for a mistrial.

State v.

Pena. 869 P.2d at 938; accord State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d 1377,
13 81 (Utah App. 1993).

A trial court abuses its discretion if

its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness.

State v.

Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). Discretion is also abused
if the actions of the judge are inherently unfair. State v.
2

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).

*[T]he denial of

a motion for a mistrial does not constitute an abuse of
discretion where no prejudice to the accused is shown."

State v.

Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permitting a

previously undisclosed witness for the State to testify on
rebuttal?
A trial court's decision with respect to the testimony of a
rebuttal witness will not be reversed "unless the appellant
demonstrates that the trial court has clearly abused its
discretion and thereby affected the appellant's substantial
rights."

Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994)

(citations omitted).
4.

Did the trial court commit plain error by failing to

view: 1) failure to pay the drug stamp tax as a lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute; and 2) reckless driving as a lesser included offense
of failure to respond to an officer's signal?
Because defendant did not preserve this issue in the trial
court, he raises it for the first time on appeal as plain error.
See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989).
5.

Was the evidence adduced by the State sufficient to
3

support the jury's verdict of guilty for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute?
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient
evidence when the evidence is uso inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime."

State

v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting State v.
Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other
grounds bv State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)).
6.

Did the trial court act within the limits of its

discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences for
the two second degree felonies of which he was convicted?
An appellate court "does not disturb a sentence unless it
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has
abused its discretion."

State v. Shelby. 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah

1986) . "An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of
the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge
imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence.'"

State v. Russell. 791

P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules will be cited in
the body of this brief.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was arrested and charged with six counts of
criminal conduct, arising out of a high speed chase on 1-15 that
resulted in the recovery of 26 grams of methamphetamine (R. 1,
36-37, 451). Following a two-day jury trial, he was convicted as
charged (R. 163-66).

Defendant waived his time for sentencing

(R. 762, 764). The trial court then sentenced him to:
consecutive 1-15 year terms in the Utah State Prison on the two
second degree felonies; two concurrent 0-5 year terms in prison
on the two third degree felonies; and six months in jail with the
remaining days stayed on the two misdemeanors (R. 775-78).

This

timely appeal followed (R. 167).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Near midnight on May 16, 1995, while working traffic
enforcement, St. George police officer Matt Stoker saw a Honda
"bullet bike" traveling east towards 1-15 (R. 326) . Executing a
U-turn to follow the motorcycle, the officer saw one of the rear
signal devices dangling, apparently broken (R. 327, 357, 360,
473).

When the motorcyclist failed to signal as he turned

southbound onto the freeway, Officer Stoker activated his
overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop (R. 327, 475).
Defendant, who was operating the bullet bike, looked over
5

his shoulder at the officer and then accelerated to approximately
80 or 90 miles an hour (R. 328) . Officer Stoker activated his
siren to get defendant's attention and initially radioed dispatch
that he was attempting to make a traffic stop.

Soon thereafter,

however, he reported that he was in hot pursuit (R. 329, 373,
533-34).
Officer Stoker testified that he saw defendant reach with
his left hand behind his waist, pull something out, and drop it
to the side of the road (R. 329, 419) . He testified that the
object made sparks as it hit the ground, and that it landed off
to the left in the median strip (R. 329, 3 95, 414). Stoker
radioed dispatch that the motorcyclist had thrown a gun (R. 3 93).
By this time, the chase had reached speeds of 90 to 110
miles an hour (R. 330). Officer Stoker then saw defendant reach
into a pouch on the right side of his waist, pull out a plastic
bag, stand up on the pegs of the bike, and throw the bag straight
over his head (R. 330) . The bag sailed over the police car (R.
331).

Shortly thereafter, defendant repeated the same action

with another plastic bag (R. 331).
The chase ended when defendant pulled over to the right,
rode through a dirt median, and eventually ran into the front of
Stoker's patrol vehicle which, by that time, was at a full stop

6

(R. 332-33, 434, 490, 517). The motorcycle fell over and
defendant, agitated, approached Stoker, yelling, "Why did you hit
me?" (R. 333, 341, 402-03) . Stoker and another officer who had
come to the scene ordered defendant to the ground.

When

defendant failed to respond after repeated orders, Stoker sprayed
mace in his face to subdue him (R. 341, 406, 433, 491, 518).
Defendant was subsequently handcuffed and arrested (R. 342).
Several officers soon began searching the area for evidence.
They found a police scanner on the ground by the bike (R. 335).
In the 1-15 travel lanes where Stoker had reported the first
plastic bag thrown, they found pieces of hypodermic syringes (R.
330, 343, 376). Just south of that area, they located a small
plastic bag with white residue that later tested positive for
methamphetamine (R. 346, 450). They also located a second,
bigger baggie containing a large amount of white substance, later
identified to be 26.3 grams of methamphetamine (R. 348-49, 382,
451) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant raises six issues on appeal.

First, he argues

that the trial court should have compelled discovery of the hot
pursuit policy of the St. George Police Department.

The court

properly ruled, however, that this information was not relevant
7

to any legal matter raised in this case.
Second, defendant argues that the court abused its
discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial, made when 1)
the court permitted a defense witness, Kim Randall, to testify in
prison clothing, and 2) the court, after a proffer, refused to
allow Randall to be transported back to court to testify for a
second time.

Both of these rulings were reasonable, and neither

prejudiced defendant.

In the first instance, it is defendant,

not his witness, who is granted the presumption of innocence and,
consequently, cannot be compelled to appear in court in prison
clothing.

In the second instance, the court heard defendant's

proffer and correctly determined that the evidence would be
cumulative and repetitive.
Third, defendant claims that the State violated his
discovery request by failing to disclose its rebuttal witness,
Kassi McArthur.

He argues thait this non-disclosure prejudiced

him because her testimony was outcome determinative, "but may not
have been had the Appellant had time to prepare" (Br. of App. at
19).

This argument fails because the State only learned during

opening statements that defendant would testify and did not know
the precise contents of that testimony until defendant actually
took the stand on the second day of trial. Thus, the State could
8

not have reasonably anticipated the testimony it would need to
rebut.
In any event, McArthur's testimony was not prejudicial.

Her

tendency to lie was revealed during her direct examination, when
the State was compelled to refresh her recollection by
confronting her with a statement she had previously given to the
St. George Sheriff's Office. And on cross-examination, defense
counsel made McArthur admit both her criminal involvement and the
self-serving nature of her testimony.

Finally, following her

testimony, defense counsel called an additional witness to
discredit McArthur.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that the State

should have disclosed its rebuttal witness, defendant suffered no
actual prejudice.

All his claim amounts to is a speculative

possibility, far short of establishing a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result for him.
Fifth, defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict that he was the individual who
possessed the drugs that the police found on the highway.

Given

the testimony of the officer who was involved in the chase,
however, as well as the corroborating dispatch tape, the jury had
some evidence before it which, along with the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, supported the
9

verdict.
Finally, defendant objects to the consecutive sentences that
the trial court imposed for the two second degree felonies for
which he was convicted.

Defendant makes the novel argument that

because he exercised his statutory right to waive time for
sentencing, the court should be foreclosed from imposing
consecutive sentences.

This argument is frivolous on its face.

Defendant himself waived the time for a presentence report and
cannot now complain that the court sentenced him on the basis of
inadequate information.

In addition, even if a report had been

prepared and had included a recommendation for concurrent
sentences, the court would have been under no obligation to
follow that recommendation.
&RSUMENT
£PINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY OF THE "HOT PURSUIT"
POLICY OF THE ST. GEORGE POLICE
DEPARTMENT BECAUSE THE POLICY WAS
IRRELEVANT TO THE LEGAL ISSUES IN
THIS CASE
In the trial court, defendant unsuccessfully sought to
compel discovery of the St. George police department policy on
"hot pursuit."

He argued:
10

I may find in those policies . . . a
violation of St. George City Police's
policies, and if it is [sic], that would go
to the credibility of the officer, and it
would also lead me into an area of if he
would violate that policy or that procedure,
would he violate others in this investigation
and arrest.
(R. 786) . On appeal, defendant attempts to establish a nexus
between policies governing hot pursuit and policies that might
apply to searches and seizures (Br. of App. at 14-15).

In

essence, he argues that the court erred in denying his motion
because an officer who would exceed the speed limit during a
chase, thus violating departmental policy, would also be likely
to conduct an unlawful search and seizure of evidence after the
chase is over.
The trial court disposed of defendant's argument on
relevance grounds:
The Court looks at the matter and determines
it as follows: The existence of a speed
limit cap on a fresh or hot pursuit policy of
the St. George City Police Department, and
whether or not such a cap was exceeded by the
pursuing officer in this matter -- and I take
specific notice that I was the judge who
heard the preliminary hearing in this matter
and listened to the testimony carefully and
have that testimony clearly in mind at this
time -- the Court's determination is that
whether or not that officer at the time
either intentionally or inadvertently
determined to violate that cap is wholly and
11

entirely collateral to the issues of this
case.
I do not find that there is a significant
connection for relevamce terms between that
policy and the actions of the officer and the
credibility of the officer under this case
under the circumstances that the officer was,
in fact, in hot pursuit behind a vehicle that
was not responding to his signal to stop,
that the officer observed items being thrown
from that vehicle and testified as such, and
I see no causal connection. Based upon that,
I deny your discovery motion.
(R. 787-88).
The trial court's ruling comes within the ambit of rule 16
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which confers upon the
court the discretion to deny discovery.
16(e).

See Utah R. Crim. P.

In this instance, the court simply determined that the

requested policy was not relevant to any legal issue before the
court.1

Because this determination is well within the "broad

discretion'' permitted trial courts in refusing discovery, it
should not be disturbed on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Knill. 656
P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982).

1

This appeal raises no search or seizure issues,
12

PQINT VfJQ
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL
Defendant moved twice for a mistrial, both times in
connection with the testimony of Kim Randall, a defense witness
incarcerated in the Kane County Jail at the time of trial (R.
112-13, 114-15).

First, defendant sought a mistrial when the

court permitted Randall, on the first day of trial, to testify
before the jury while wearing prison clothes (R. 463). Second,
defendant moved for a mistrial when, on the second day, following
a proffer, the court refused to recall Randall from jail to
testify again (R. 679) .
In reviewing a decision to deny a motion for a mistrial, a
reviewing court grants the trial court a "great deal" of
discretion, disturbing its determination only if the decision is
beyond the limits of reasonableness or inherently unfair. Pena.
869 P.2d at 938/ Ql£SH, 860 P.2d at 334; Eaillirei, 817 P.2d at
781-82 n.3.

u

[T]he denial of a motion for a mistrial does not

constitute an abuse of discretion where no prejudice to the
accused is shown."

Workman. 635 P.2d at 53.

In this case, the

trial court's two determinations, when viewed in the context of
the trial as a whole, fell well within the limits of its
13

discretion.
1.

The trial court's decision to permit Kim Randall, a
witness for defendant, to testify in prison clothing

was reasonable
Defendant recognizes that it is the accused who must not be
compelled to stand trial before a jury while dressed in
identifiable prison clothing (Br. of App. at 21).

The gist of

his argument is that this right wshould be extended to witnesses
for the Defendant" (Id.).2

Where, as here, defendant has failed

to support his argument with any legal analysis or authority, a
reviewing court may decline to rule on it.

State v. Amicone, 689

P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Even on the merits, however, defendant's proposition fails.
It is axiomatic that every accused person is presumed innocent
until proven guilty.

Consequently, w[t]o implement the

presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine
the fairness of the fact-finding process."
425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).

Estelle v, Williams,

For a defendant to be compelled to

2

Defendant argues that n[f]or the Defendant to have a
witness testify in shackles and jail overalls is probably the
same as not having a witness at all" (Br. of App. at 21) . This
argument is severely undercut by the fact that the State's
rebuttal witness, Kassi McArthur, whom defendant complains
prejudiced the outcome of the trial, also testified in prison
clothing.
14
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defendant is a person disport «i 1

•• iinii

"

L eopln ^

Froehlig. 1 Cal. Rptn , 2d 858, 860 (Cal. Ct. App, 1991J ; cf.
E£J2J^^

"

JU

'" '
" I'pL-i • 'li-J. '1 ' K.il. r t App

1984] l finding presumption vi innocence rationale "mapp.1 i c. ihl e
where an independent witness, not charged wit;,}} responsibility for
the crime nor shown '

*»«? 'i'liuf in concei.r

is the one who Is shackled I
ppc
prejudici-*
consequenti

II i- < IH.^nd.niL,

Although r. he credibility of a

3t»ii «jdil:) may be more suspect, "the

impact upon the defense is considered V] ess
'"

Id, , ; cf. People v. Allen. 729 P. 2d 115, 140
15

(Cal. 1986), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 872 (1987) (*[T]he
prejudicial

effect

of shackling defense witnesses is less

consequential since 'the shackled witness . . . [does] not
directly affect the presumption of innocence.'") (citations
omitted).
In this case, the court took extra precautions to ensure
that Kim Randall's testimony would not be diminished because he
appeared in prison garb.

First, the court swore the witness in

and seated him in the witness box before the jury returned to the
courtroom (R. 461). Thus, his slippers and shackles were not
visible to the jury.

See id. at 139-40 (finding it significant

that there was no evidence any of the jurors saw shackles on
witness).

For the same reason, the witness left the courtroom

only after the jurors had left (R. 482-83).

Second, prior to

Randall's testimony, the court gave the jury a cautionary
instruction to remind them of their duty to evaluate each witness
individually.3

3

Under these circumstances, where the witness had

The Court instructed the jury:
The person seated in the witness chair right
now is Mr. Kim Randall. Mr. Randall
presently resides in the Kane County Jail and
is here from that facility to testify in this
matter. You can see that Mr. Randall is
dressed in orange clothing, but that is
16

nil in in 1111 in in iiji a p p ;.:>J2 .in c i v Lliaii c l o t h i n g a n d w h e r e t h e

minimized any adverse

court

^

'irv
• L1

the trial court's decision to have the witnej- Lost.: ^
garb

was neiti :ie n beyond tl le limits of reasonableness nor

inherently unfair. 4

. ..

Consequently, because defendant failed to show how Kim
Randall ' r 1 >• \\ i f MI i

|ii

m

J n Innj i > L e j uJictsd the outcome of

consistent with his present residence and
cnly with his residence. Mr, Randall has • ••'
been accused of criminal violations, b1 f he
is presumed innocent just as Mr Souza is
p re s ume d innocent.
Mr*, Randall, even though he is in custody at
this time, should be given the same attention
and you should apply the same rules that the
Court has previously given to you Irir -judging
the credibility of witnesses.
Let me point out specifically arid i i istruct
you specifically that the fact that Mr.
Randall is presently residing in r; > Kane
County Jail, that he is dressed in jrange
clothing, as you can see, should be taken by
you as absolutely no evidence, • id verseinference should be drawn from that a. n v.! J.. '.
should not be used as any indication, one way
er the other f with respect to Mn<=- •-••^i- 1 ^ty
Randa 1.1' s test imony.

;-.•;:.. ly, the cc, nut: did not give an analogous cautionar y
instruction prior to the testimony of Kassi McArthur, the state's
rebuttal witness.
11

the case, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's first motion for a mistrial.
.2.

The trial court's refusal to recall Kim Randall to

testify Q H the second day of trial was justified,
Defendant made his second motion for a mistrial when the
trial court, after a proffer, refused to recall Kim Randall to
testify for a second time (R. 679). Defendant contends that the
court's denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion
and that this error, in combination with others, rendered his
trial inherently unfair (Br. of App. at 22).

When considered in

context, however, the reasonableness of the court's ruling
becomes apparent.
Prior to trial, in response to defendant's ex parte motion,
the court issued a transportation order for Kim Randall to be
brought from the Kane County Jail to Fifth District Court by 1:30
p.m. on the first day of trial (R. 112-13, 114-15).

The order

further stated that Randall was to be kept at the Washington
County jail until the close of trial (R. 115). Late in the
afternoon on the first day of trial, after one of the State's
witnesses finished testifying, the court announced:
Members of the jury, at this juncture in the
lawsuit, we are going to call a witness out
of order for the convenience of the person
not involved with the trial. We will call a
18

:

-- witness out of order. This is a defense
witness asked by Mr. Scarth. Ordinarily, you
wouldn't be hearing from defense witnesses in
• the middle of the prosecution,' s case, but
. . counsel have agreed that this may be done out
of order, and we will next ca] 1 Mr Kim,,
Randall.
(~

4S7-5?'

""ie cc .r: then called a short . ^cess.
nresence ^ f

S— s- \
thanked the r*y^~

defense counsel

: c . allowing iu.iu txiue L U ;

" ru:lal I ,

stating that he and defendant "have had sufficient time to
interview him

W•I

I I

IMI

I111. l.'j.il mi ny i'j HULL;-I. i.al

ULL ) •

V ti'nJ.-'l 1 then testified on direct, and the prosecutor crossexamined I i i, in.
On the second day of trial, the defense presented ,i i c use."
Defendant testified, followed by three other defense witnesses.
- . . . . , . . -owiry

second

. ~~ ^

, 673J . When xL became apparent that Randal I

n.z present, the court, out of the presence of the ji iry, sta # ed:
Counsel, before you make whatever
determinations you want to do about M r .
Randall's lack of presence, I recall that we
called Mr. Randall out of order in the middle
of the State's case in order to take his
testimony. Now, I thought we had it all
done, and I can see why he may have gone t -rk
[to the Kane County Jail], but we did call
him out of order specifically for f hat
purpose„

IS

(R. 673). Shortly thereafter, a conversation between the court
and counsel revealed a disagreement as to why Randall had been
called out of order,5

Without resolving the matter, the court

then requested a proffer of what Randall would testify to if
recalled (See addendum A ) . After the proffer, the court found
"that that evidence is repetitive, cumulative, has already been
addressed by other competent testimony, that it is unnecessary at
this point," accepted the proffer, and denied defendant's request
to recall Mr. Randall (R. 679). Defendant then moved for a
mistrial, and the court denied the motion (R. 679-80).

5

The following exchange between the court and the parties
outlines the difference of opinion:
The Court:
D. Counsel:
Prosecutor:
D. Counsel:

The Court:
Prosecutor:
The Court:

Mr. Randall was called out of order
at your request.
No, at the Court's request.
I don't believe that's correct, your
honor.
The Court asked us to approach the
bench. The Court led a discussion with
[the prosecutor] and myself and made the
suggestion that he be called out of
order.
Because Mr. Randall was in custody at
the time.
Along with the State's expert.
My recollection is that Mr. Randall and
Mr. Gerlits were both competing for a
narrow time slot.

(R. 677-78).
20

On appeal, defendant does not: contest the court's ruling
tlidt. the evidence pi offered w a s repetitive, but rather that the
request for a proffer caucrht, linn " I'll quaifd' «,:niKii rtut,
consequently, he, "was not able to articulate the full range of
q -~s -

>.| I I ici I

" 11| i I'Jt 2 2 ) .

I

ii'ii'i 111 .Jiiiii ni 111 ] u n
w

He further argues

asking

r he

witness."

(Br.

of

the answers to questions c

direct testimony couI ,1 have elicited questions beyond those
stated to the court h

i-num^l"

(Pi

x

11 '

.

Defense counsel here finds himself in • ,.*- uncomfortable
: •?

. £e:in r , *

.^1^^111

realizing

belatedly thai _e *«i*. questions unasked a n a
Counsel's own, omissions or failure to argue his case
persuaf"."-

no an abuse

, . .-

of discretion
rt ..

*~J~, *.*^*, (Utah

. ;.•&;£ v. Perry
-

. - - .a»j...;j .ic=:fecti"e i r s ; s c a r c e o f

rnuri'ie I1 •

li i c e s

in h i n d s i g h t h i s or her

choices

c o u n s e l c l a i m s , r e v i e w i n g c o u r t s must ileffi
regarding t r i a l
were *i n r o r i PC
preferred

strategy,
)

even i f

nriiiil inns f m\ \ r r rr\ I

Whon,

il

\\-i h e r e r

t e s t i m o n y was r e p e t i t i v e and h a d no o b v i o u s

'..sues,

an 1 wli. LU d,.it.,jndant

a b s e n c e of t h e p r e f e r r e d
c a s e f o r him, t h e t r i \l

the
relevance

lias n o t e x p l a i n e d how t h e

t e s t i m o n y pupjurli rni 1 il he I HIJ! CCHHP
court's

r u l i n g should remain
21

il il lie

undisturbed.

State y, workman. 635 p.2d at 53.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED
A PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED REBUTTAL
WITNESS FOR THE STATE TO TESTIFY
WHERE THE NEED FOR HER TESTIMONY
BECAME APPARENT ONLY AFTER THE
TRIAL HAD BEGUN
The gist of defendant's complaint is that the State violated
its discovery request by failing to disclose Kassi McArthur as a
rebuttal witness.6

This non-disclosure, argues defendant,

prejudiced him because wit is highly likely that McArthur7s
testimony was outcome determinative . . . but may not have been
had the Appellant had time to prepare" (Br. of App. at 19). 7

6

While defendant also complains that the statement
McArthur gave to the Washington County Sheriff's Office was not
disclosed to him prior to trial, he does not raise this as a
separate issue, choosing rather to primarily focus on the State's
failure to disclose Kassi McArthur as a rebuttal witness. In any
event, he received the statement during trial and admits that he
was able to use the document to cross-examine McArthur (Br. of
App. at 19).
7

He also argues that the court denied him his right to a
fair trial by: 1) not granting his motion for a mistrial; and 2)
not continuing the trial sua sponte to allow him time to prepare
for McArthur's testimony (Br. of App. at 18). As to the first
contention, the record reveals that he never moved for a mistrial
on this issue. As to the second contention, the burden rests
with defendant, not the court, to seek a continuance for
preparation time. See State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883
(Utah 1988); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 1987).
22

Disclosure of rebuttal witnesses is governed by "whether the

anticipated
1
850

prior
...

*-.*_.

Turner v. Nelson. <*#* P.2d ±u2i,

v. *. .wns o^it-ec?^ ; accord StatS-Ei Tennyson,
*

r.-iQ it

i

trial court in making this determination because the trial court
x

ii"i,iJc-11(„<r> betoivi it: and was in the best position to

determine whether [the state] could reasonab] y have anti ci pated
[defendant's] testimony "

Turner, H7? F 2d at 1024.

H^'i: e, ! I hi illpfemse c o u n s e l j n d I he SLdt e iiiuvecl t o r
disclosure of each oiher's witnesses, pursuant to rule 16 of the
L^i

_. ~

complied with the ieq^
the State' i

Q-tr\\

.-.",*.* . -. , _ ^ _

*s- ;

r.ier

8 wh:He ^hr: State

' -"

:

^rcri ,• ntains no evidence that

defendant compl i e ::i wi til: i t::]ll: le i: eq uest.

Consequently, only when the

trial began and defense counsel made his opening statement cli ci
the State even learn that defendant planned K? testify '- -19,
3 20).

*uiu

- •" " "

-

8

.1

The State is 'moving to supplement the record on appeal
with its Request for Discovery, dated October 3, 1 995.
''•'•"
\ Jhile no .record evidence attests to the contents oi ..«=
State's response, the State does not disagree with defendant's
representation that McArthur was not 1 isted.
23

defendant took the witness stand on the second day of trial,
explaining in detail that he was throwing cans of beer from his
motorcycle during the chase.

Only at this juncture did the State

know that it would need to call defendant's girlfriend, Kassi
McArthur to rebut defendant's version of what happened.10
When McArthur took the stand, she testified that defendant
told her he threw methamphetamine from the bike, that he asked
her to tell the police that he had not thrown anything, and that
he did not threaten her in any way.

Since this testimony was in

part contrary to what McArthur had earlier told the police, the
State then introduced a police report from the Washington County
Sheriff's Office to refresh her recollection (R. 688).
Under the circumstances, then, since the State knew neither
defendant's theory of the case nor whether defendant would
testify, it could not have anticipated the need to call McArthur
as a witness.

See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472-73 (Utah

App. 1993)(undisclosed rebuttal witness permitted where State, in
good faith, had no reason to expect need for such witness).

10

The State had moved, prior to trial, for McArthur to be
transported from the Utah State Prison to the Washington County
jail, presumably so she would be readily available if needed (R.
106-07). Plainly, however, if defendant had not testified, there
would have been no need for her to testify in rebuttal.
24

In any event, the testimony offered, by Kassi McArthur was
unlikely to have prejudiced defendant for severa 1 —•**•—is.
First

w I in ill i M w

p

l -Hi i In M i d llrst imony hi in McArlhin tJ: lat •

rebutted defendant's story, it also impeached hei by showing that
she waiJ i>inj I I.I Mn

lury about whethei deteiidanL Llireatened 1 ler.

That is, she first testified that defendant simp] y asked hex to
lie to the jury, denying that he threatened her (R, 6 8 7 ) .
the State confronted I: le i:

When

I

Washinator C:;u;:iu Sri-iiiff's C:tiize,
deran-iar.;. . . ^«*» mr^r**

however, she -idnLitced that

hreater. her*

[0] rie aignu ne JI.J ;; -.-: rue ,. :.. .a:'.*..
lot of my apartment because he hart been • he
A..itei Tie o sa\
:' * r:e .\:p ^ r
behind me ;:o see hi~ rr.r:w anything, ana .
told him T wouldn't. And le r&i?
' ^ z ing

(R, 6 9 0 ) .

In addition, defense counsel cross-examined McArthur •

e f £ e c t: i i- e 1 y , c a u s i i I g h e i: t ::: a dm i t: t h a t s h e w a s i n prison f o r
violating parole for a crime of dishonesty and that she was
testifying in order to lessen her own pending sentencing on a
f -"* .

i

A

t:i ( i: ( R 6 9 3 , 7 0 3 )

•' ' • . •• • •

;. -irigate any possible prejudicial effect of
McArthur

, _ .

r

ana

.

chur's

incriminating statements, defense counsel called Peggy

McReynolds, defendant's mother, as a final witness (R. 710).
McReynolds testified that McArthur was a scorned lover of
defendant's, bitter about defendant's engagement to McArthur's
closest friend (R. 711). She testified: *[McArthur] called my
house.

She called my son's house, my other son.

She said she

was going to get back with Kenny if it was the last thing she
did, that nobody was going to dump her" (R. 711).
Finally, while defense counsel claimed surprise and failure
to provide discovery when the State called Kassi McArthur, he
never asked for a continuance or, as he asserts in his brief, for
a mistrial.

Indeed, no plea for specific relief appears anywhere

in the record.

Even now, on appeal, he argues only that more

time might have allowed him to better prepare for McArthur's
testimony.

Where, as here, however, he effectively impeached her

testimony, it is hard to imagine what else defense counsel might
have done.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the State should have
disclosed McArthur as a rebuttal witness, defendant suffered no
prejudice.

£££ State V. Knigh£, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)

("Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
[defendant's] motions . . . depends entirely upon a determination
of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce the requested
26

information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal
i inder Rule 3 0 [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] "x

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant.
Consequently , the tri a] court* s decision should be affirmed

M,,,,,

POINT FOUR
AS A MATTER OF LAW, FAILURE TO PAY
THE DRUG STAMP TAX IS NOT A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE AND RECKLESS DRIVING IS
NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S
SIGNAL
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that failure
t.1.1 |

lie < I r 11*1 -J fiiiip tax is a lesser included offense of

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
r

-.;- ^..«^::^ .

. „ asser i. .. . „. . ::ense of .....re

to respond to a.a officer's signax vBi . yt ?

. au 2 J - 2 7 J . io

prevail under such circumstances, defendant must establish three
elements

II) llul

HI n'mr ni.'ivn nvrl; (,') M M I l IIP r-rror wnn

obvious; and (3) that: the error was harmful.

State v. Dunn. 850

P.2d 1201, 12UU lUUh l'JUJ), State v. Ellifritz.fc|j';,l\ 2d 1/0,
174 (Utah App. ii^i/ . If any one of these elements is missing,
o7

plain error cannot be found, fiunn* 850 P.2d at 1209.

In this

case, the analysis need not go beyond the first element.
Section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code prevents a defendant
from being convicted of two offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode when one offense is a lesser included offense of
the other. fi££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a) (1995) .

* [A] n

offense is lesser included when proof of one crime necessarily
proves all of the elements of the second crime."

State v.

EXQfikS, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted).

Utah

courts use a two-part test for making this determination.

Id.

(citing State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)).

First, the

court engages in ua purely theoretical comparison" of the
statutory elements of the two crimes to assess whether proof of
the more serious offense will necessarily always satisfy the
elements of the lesser offense.
resolves the controversy.

Id.

Usually, this comparison
If, however, the statute defines

a crime by listing variations in the elements, the court must
take the second analytical step.

It must examine the facts of

the particular case to determine which statutory variation was
proved and whether, in fact, a lesser included relationship
exists between the two crimes. Id.
In this case, the "purely theoretical comparison" required
28

t i I

1

1 1 u.i

I n

.I

Finn

If i r , i n i

i i ii

I i idgh-j

i f ) f f f^\)

cjpg

ciearlv reveals that failure to pay the drug stamp tax is not a
lessci Ui^x^ed uttense ui possession of a controlled substance
with intent L U distribute,

MM it •; f ir-n

i hr rrime of failure I

pay the drug stamp tax requires that the accused, a "dealer," did
not j: c .5 !::l: :i =

, I J-- HI I In ilr ugs

^.y III: ah Code Aiui

k Vj-

19-106(2) (1996), .Plainly, this tax and revenue provision is not
an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance
1 id t:J: ] :! 1: it 2nt t> ::: • ::i i s t r .

eixient s • if I li. a

more serious crime, possession of a control] sd substance with
.. .ibute, cannot prove all the elements of the lesser

inte..*

crime, failure co pay the drug stamp tax.
step .:f the Brooks araV/sis

Applying the first

tl-.er.. ;eveals * ~ r *ta" fla* '.

Defendant's second assertion, that ^eck^ess dri/irg _s a
lesser included offense of failure to respond to an officer's
signal to stop, requires a more extensive analysis.

Fi rst,

failure to respond to an officer's signal includes two
vara at :i :i)r:i s

'I '• :::: •fce g i :i :i "I t:::.;; ::: i: tl: :i :i s o f f e n s e

a fil 1: i ei: ni: iiiist

initially receive a signal from an officer to stop and then
either

1 ) operate hi s vehicle to interfere with operation,, of any

ol'hfM 'mhir-li' ui 1 ndanqer any | ipr sum ni
29

ijhi 11- 1 1 'I 1! t eni| ill il 1

flee or elude the officer.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-

13.5(1) (1996); State v. Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah App.
1995).

Depending on which variation applies, the completed

offense may or may not include the elements of reckless driving.
The second step of the Brooks test directs that, under such
circumstances, *[t]he court must look at the evidence actually
presented at trial to determine which of the statutory variations
were proved and whether those variations created a lesser
included relationship between the crimes."
861 (citing Hill. 674 P.2d at 97).

Brooks. 908 P.2d at

If there are sufficient

independent grounds, even though they arise out of one criminal
episode, defendant may be convicted of both offenses.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1996); State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70,
89-90 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v,
Mirguet. 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2; State v, Shaffer, 725 p.2d
1301, 1314 n.3 (Utah 1986).
In this case, evidence was adduced at trial to prove that
defendant received a signal to stop and then attempted to flee or
elude the officer (R. 327, 328, 533-34).

This crime was

completed as soon as defendant made the turn onto 1-15, looked
back over his shoulder, and then accelerated (R. 328). The
additional crime of reckless driving consisted of the chase that
30

ensued, covering more than two miles and reaching speeds of close
to 100 miles per hour (R. 330, 336) . Where, as here, separate
elements established the two crimes independently, reckless
driving is not a lesser included offense of failure to respond to
an officer's signal to stop.

See Wood. 868 P.2d at 89-90;

Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1314 n.3.
Because defendant has raised these claims on appeal as plain
error but has not demonstrated that the trial court committed any
error, let alone an obvious and prejudicial error, his lesser
included offense argument must fail,
POINT FIVE
CONSIDERING BOTH THE FACTS AND THE
INFERENCES THAT MAY REASONABLY BE
DRAWN FROM THOSE FACTS, THE JURY
HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF POSSESSION OF
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT
TO DISTRIBUTE
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute-

Specifically, he complains of the

paucity of direct evidence tying him to the significant quantity
of methamphetamine found on the highway (Br. of App. at 28-29).
To support his argument, he highlights testimony from Officer
Staley on cross-examination, confirming that 1-15 as it connects
31

to 1-70 is known as a pipeline for illegal substances (R. 531).
He also contends that Officer Stoker's testimony about where the
baggie containing 26.3 grams of methamphetamine was found fails
to match up precisely with where he reported objects being thrown
from the motorcycle (Br. of App. at 28).
At the outset, a jury's verdict will not be reversed because
the jury failed to preclude all other possible explanations for
the presence of the contraband on the highway, as defendant
suggests with his "pipeline" theory.

See, e.g.. State v.

Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993) (stating appellate court
will affirm if, during its review, it finds "some evidence or
inferences upon which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made") (emphasis added) (citing State
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).

Rather, in order to

reverse a criminal conviction based on a jury verdict for
insufficient evidence, this Court must determine that the
evidence was "so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that
the defendant committed the crime."

State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d

at 543. This is a high standard, mandating that a jury's verdict
remain undisturbed "so long as some evidence and reasonable
inferences" support the jury's decision.
32

State v. Moore. 802

P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).
Here, evidence amply supported the jury's conclusion that
defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute it.
Officer Stoker testified that he saw three objects thrown from
the motorcycle while defendant fled south on 1-15.

First, he saw

defendant release what appeared to be a handgun (R. 329, 368,
3 93, 3 94).

Next, he saw defendant reach behind his waist, pull

out a plastic bag, and throw it over his head (R. 330) . Finally,
as defendant neared the south offramp of the highway, Stoker saw
him repeat the same motion, throwing a second plastic baggie over
his head (R. 331).
Once the chase was over and defendant was secured, Officer
Stoker, along with others, searched the area for evidence.11
Near where he had seen defendant throw the first baggie, Officer
Stoker "found several pieces of hypodermic syringes, and they
were scattered throughout the median, in the freeway, itself, in
the travel -- both travel lanes, and on both sides of the
freeway'' (R. 343) . In the area where he saw the second bag
thrown, "going southbound from 400 East . . . in the outside lane

11

The search was facilitated by a local ambulance driver
who showed up and loaned the officers a hand-held spotlight (R.
378) .
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closest to the median,'' the officer found a small bag with white
residue in it (R. 346) . He also located, uon the southbound
lanes on the west side of the freeway . . . in the emergency lane
in the area of where the grooves are cut, if you get too far over
it makes a sound," a large quantity of methamphetamine, with an
estimated street value of $2600 (R. 348, 485).
That the large quantity of methamphetamine may not have been
found precisely where the officer saw a baggie thrown is not
dispositive, as defendant suggests (Br. of App. at 28).

The

vehicles, according to defendant himself, were traveling at up to
90 miles an hour (R. 555). Certainly, when traveling at that
rate of speed, it would be difficult to judge precisely where any
thrown item would either initially land or ultimately come to
rest.12
Given this testimony, confirmed with a recorded audio tape
of the officer's on-going communication with police dispatch, a

12

In addition, the jury also heard testimony from Kim
Randall, defendant's employer at the time, who stated that he
followed defendant onto the highway as the chase began (R. 47475). Kassi McArthur, a girlfriend of defendant's, testified that
she, too, was on 1-15 in the area of the chase on the night in
question (R. 686) . While neither witness testified that they
stopped, the jury knew they had been in the immediate vicinity
and could conceivably have had access to the evidence defendant
threw from the bike.
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jury could reasonably infer that it was defendant who threw the
items found on the freeway in order to rid himself of
incriminating evidence.

Because the record testimony and the

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that testimony
support the conclusion that defendant was the individual who
possessed the methamphetamine found on the highway after the
chase, the jury's verdict should remain undisturbed.

Moore. 802

P.2d at 738.

POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES FOR THE TWO SECOND DEGREE
FELONIES OF WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED
An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed by a
trial court unless the sentence exceeds the limits prescribed by
law or unless the court abuses its discretion in imposing that
sentence.

State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (citing

State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)).

In this case,

because the trial court had statutory authority pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) to impose consecutive sentences, the only
remaining question is whether the court abused its discretion by
so doing.
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in two
35

ways: first, by not insisting on a presentence report and,
instead, honoring defendant's waiver of the time for sentencing
and, second, by sentencing him to consecutive sentences without
the benefit of a presentence report (Br. of App. at 32). In
essence, defendant argues that he was unfairly sentenced to
consecutive sentences because the judge knew nothing about him.
His argument resolves itself into a novel rule: that when a
defendant refuses to allow time for preparation of a presentence
report, the court should be limited to imposing concurrent
sentences.
This "rule" plainly makes no sense.

First, it was defendant

himself who waived the presentence report.

See Utah Code Ann. §

77-18-1(5) (a) (1995 & Supp. 1996) (allowing the court to continue
the date of sentencing, "with the concurrence of the defendant,"
in order to obtain a presentence investigation report or other
information about defendant).
lightly.

Defendant did not take this action

Indeed, the court explained at length why allowing time

for a presentence report would accrue to his benefit:
I will request your wish to waive time for
sentencing and impose sentence at this point,
but let me at least give you the benefit of
my observations before I do so.
As you well know, the matters before the
Court are serious. Each of them carry 1 to
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15 years incarceration in the Utah State
Prison, and that is by legislative
determination. Without further information,
with only the bold record of the facts and
circumstances that I have heard during trial,
I am given little, if any opportunity to more
carefully review this matter.
My contact with you throughout the months
that this case and other matters have been
pending is such that I believe you are a man
of substantial intelligence, substantial
insight, frankly, a very personable
individual separate and apart from this
criminal conduct.
I guess what I'm saying is that you may have
done bad things, but that doesn't make you a
bad person.

I may not have the ability to do much other
than impose the sentence. If you wish me to
do so, and it is my job and my duty and I
will so that if it is your request, but I
would be remiss if I told you that I would
not also benefit from a presentence report.
It's up to you, sir, though. If you wish to
waive the time for sentencing, I will proceed
if that is your desire.
(R. 763-64) . Defendant then exercised his statutory right and
waived time for sentencing (R. 764). Under the circumstances,
where the court plainly wanted a presentence report and defendant
refused, he cannot now argue that the court should have ignored
his choice and ordered the report anyway.

Cf. State v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024
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(1990) (if a party leads the trial court into error, a reviewing
court will not save that party from the error).
Second, defendant has not shown or even suggested that the
court would have imposed a more lenient sentence had it reviewed
a presentence report.13

Indeed, the most likely implication from

defendant's refusal to allow time for a report is that he
believed additional information about his criminal past would
only lead the court to sentence him more harshly.

And, finally,

even if a presentence report had been prepared, the court would
have been "no more bound by that recommendation that it was by
the State's, the alienists', or the defendant's."

State v.

13

Although defendant may have hoped to receive a more
lenient sentence by waiving the presentence report, surprise or
disappointment in the severity of his sentence is not grounds for
reversal. Cf. State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976)
("[A] mere subjective belief of a defendant as to potential
sentence, or hope of leniency, unsupported by an promise from the
prosecutor indication by the court, is insufficient to invalidate

a guilty plea"),- accord State v. Hansen/ 627 p.2d 53, 55 (Utah
1981) (To allow defendant's mere hope or belief to invalidate a
guilty plea "would virtually require the granting of such a
motion in every case where the defendant is not satisfied with
the sentence the court determines to impose."). Similarly, if
this Court disturbs the sentence imposed by the trial court, it
is opening the door for future defendants to waive the time for
preparing a presentence report and then, later, to complain about
the severity of their sentence.
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Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) .14
Because the evidence before this Court confirms that the
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was reasonable
under the circumstances presented by this case, this Court should
affirm the trial court's determination.

See State v. Hamilton.

827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)(citing State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)).

. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / H day of November, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

14

The Utah Supreme Court has also consistently recognized
that a trial court "has very wide discretion in sentencing."
State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980); accord State v.
Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984).
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Addendum A

i /a

951500570
1

THE COURT:

3

custody at the time.

4

6

2-8-96

he be called out of order.

2

5

VOL. II

MR. LUDLOW:

Because Mr. Randall was in

Along with the State's

expert.
THE COURT:

My recollection is that Mr.

7

Randall and Mr. Gerlits were both competing for a

8

narrow time slot.

9

if Mr. Randall were called, counsel?

10
11

What is your proffer of testimony
What would you

have him testify to?
MR. SCARTH:

Okay.

I'll give that

12

proffer, Your Honor.

13

Randall were recalled as witness for the defense

14

that he would testify that the scanner, which has

15

been received in evidence as an item taken into

16

evidence by the officers at the scene of the arrest,

17

was, when he last saw it, being Kim Randall, he last

18

saw it at the Taco Bell that it was attached to the

19

bullet bike motorcycle of Mr. Souza.

20

I proffer that if Mr. Kim

He would also testify that as he drove

21

past the location of the stop of this motorcycle on

22

1-15 proceeding south that the motorcycle was laying

23

right next to 1-15 only a foot or two from the paved

24

surface and that the distance between the overturned

25

motorcycle and the police patrol car was no more
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VOL. II

2-8-96

than three feet.

2

He would testify that that night he did

3

not communicate with Kenneth Souza after Mr. Souza

4

left the Taco Bell on St. George Boulevard.

5

not have another discussion with him, by any means,

6

until 8 or after 8 a.m. the morning of the 17th of

.7

May, 1995.

He did

8

He would testify that that morning when he

9

saw Kenneth Souza that he observed that on the right

10

side of his head he had a lump and the skin was

11

broken.

12

He would testify that when Kenneth Souza

13

left him at the Taco Bell on St. George Boulevard

14

that he knew that Kenneth Souza had a camera in the

15

black pouch that was received into evidence.

16

THE COURT:

All right, counsel.

The Court

17

finds that that evidence is repetitive, cumulative,

18

has already been addressed by other competent

19

testimony, that it is unnecessary at this point.

20

Your proffer is made.

21

Randall is denied.

22

make other than that is over your vociferous

23

objection?

24
25

Your request to recall Mr.

Any further record you need to

MR.. SCARTH:

I move for a mistrial on the

basis that we have been denied to this witness, been

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING (801) 652-9971
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702

